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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. S00045-CA 
v. » 
BRIAN E. KAGUIRE, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a denial of a motion to withdraw 
a no contest plea to aggravated assault, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the taking of defendant's plea of no contest 
conform with legal requirements? An appellate court "will not 
interfere with a trial judge's determination that a defendant has 
failed to show good cause [for withdrawal of a guilty plea] 
unless it clearly appears that the trial judge abused his 
discretion." State v. Mildenhally 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987). 
2. Did the trial court have jurisdiction to hear 
defendant's motion to withdraw his no contest plea, and does the 
Utah Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over defendant's appeal 
from denial of his motion? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1)(Supp. 1990): 
The district court has original jurisdiction 
in all matters civil and criminal, not 
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not 
prohibited by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1990): 
The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over 
. . . 
(f) appeals from district court in 
criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital 
felony; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77~35-ll(e) (Supp. 1988) (amended 
1989, repealed eff. July 1, 1990).* 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest and shall not accept 
such a plea until the court has made the 
findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a 
jury trial and to confront and cross-examine 
in open court the witnesses against him, and 
that by entering the plea he waives all of 
those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
Effective April 24, 1989, former rule 11(e) was redesignated as 
rule 11(5). 
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all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result 
of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been 
reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting 
attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea 
to a lesser included offense, or the 
dismissal of other charges, the same shall be 
approved by the court. If recommendations as 
to sentence are allowed by the court, the 
court shall advise the defendant personally 
that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On January 21, 1988, defendant was charged with 
aggravated assault, a £hird degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-5-103 (1990); mayhem, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105 (1990); and being a 
habitual criminal, a first degree felony, *in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990)(R. 31). On March 4, 1988, defendant 
pleaded not guilty to all charges. On April 21, 1988, defendant 
executed an affidavit and entered a no contest plea to the charge 
of aggravated assault (R. 111-12); (transcript of plea hearing 
(hereinafter "T.M) 8). The other two charges were withdrawn on 
the same date (T. 9). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the 
prosecution recommended to the trial court that defendant be 
sentenced for the offense as a class A misdemeanor (T. 11). The 
trial court accepted the prosecution's recommendation and 
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sentenced defendant to one year in the Salt Lake County Jail with 
credit for 30 days served (T. 14-15). Defendant chose to serve 
his sentence at the Utah State Prison (T. 15), and he completed 
his term on or about March 22, 1989. Defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea on August 10, 1988 (R. 124-29). On 
November 30, 1989, a hearing was held on defendant's motion, and 
on December 1, 1989 the trial court denied the motion (R. 241-
2 
43). The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, and signed the order on December 15, 1989 (R. 256-60). 
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on January 10, 1990 (R. 263-
64). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 21, 1988, defendant entered a no contest plea 
to one count of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990). Defendant's plea 
was entered as the result of a plea agreement in which, in 
exchange for defendant's plea, the prosecution agreed to move to 
dismiss charges of mayhem, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann § 76-5-105 (1990), and of being a habitual 
criminal, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-8-1001 (1990), and to recommend that defendant be sentenced 
as though the offense were a class A misdemeanor (T. 2-3, R. 
112)• The charge had resulted from an incident in which 
defendant allegedly assaulted his grandmother, ripping off part 
Judge James S. Sawaya presided over defendant's guilty plea 
proceeding but recused himself after defendant filed his motion 
to withdraw the plea (R. 217). The case was reassigned to Judge 
Richard H. Moffat. 
-4-
of her ear and inflicting other injuries (R. 31). 
At the hearing on defendant's no contest plea defendant 
signed a standard affidavit explaining to him his rights, in 
conformity rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (a copy 
of the affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum A). The 
transcript of the hearing reflects that defendant was told the 
acts he committed which gave rise to the charges (T. 3); that, by 
virtue of his prior not guilty plea, he was presumed innocent 
until he had been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (Id.); 
that the State had the burden of proving each element of each 
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt (T. 3-4,7); that 
defendant had no burden to prove his innocence (T. 4); that 
defendant had a right to a trial by jury (Id.); that the court 
treated a no contest plea the same as a guilty plea (.Id.); and 
that the court was not,bound by the prosecution's recommendation 
concerning sentencing (T. 5). Defendant stated that he had read 
and understood the affidavit he was signing and the rights, 
elements of the crime and facts giving rise to the charges, as 
set forth in that affidavit (T. 6-7). Defendant also testified 
that he understood the penalties for the offense of a third 
degree felony and that he was signing the affidavit of his own 
free will without force, coercion or threat (T. 5,8). After 
signing the affidavit, defendant entered a no contest plea (Id.). 
Defendant waived the statutory time limit for 
sentencing and was sentenced, as recommended by the prosecution, 
to a term of one year with a credit of 30 days, as though he had 
pleaded no contest to a class A misdemeanor charge (T. 9, 14). 
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In a discussion regarding defendant's sentencing, defendant's 
counsel, with defendant present, discussed defendant's parole 
status. She stated, in pertinent part, "[t]he Board of Pardons 
will have to consider some technical matters, violations as well 
as this new conviction, and they will no doubt give him some more 
time than that [referring to the class A misdemeanor sentence]. . 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his 
plea, defendant testified that he had not read the affidavit he 
had signed at the time of his plea (transcript of hearing on 
motion to withdraw plea (hereinafter "TA.") 49) but admitted to 
having testified to the contrary at the plea hearing (TA. 51-52). 
He testified to his belief that he was entering a contract with 
the "Executive Branch" of the Utah State government and that any 
agreement he made in his plea was binding on both the county 
attorney and Adult Probation and Parole, as agents of the 
"Executive Branch" (TA. 53-54). Defendant also asserted, without 
offering documentary or other evidence, tfiat his parole from the 
Utah State Prison was revoked solely as a result of the 
conviction arising from his no contest plea (TA. 54). He stated 
that he was coerced into entering the plea (TA. 57). Defendant 
did not testify to and no other evidence was offered asserting 
any deficiencies in the taking of the no contest plea. 
In denying defendant's motion, the trial court 
concluded, inter alia, that defendant's plea was entered 
knowingly and voluntarily and that the State of Utah had kept 
good faith with defendant and delivered each of its promises made 
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to defendant up through sentencing (R. 258) (a copy of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law is attached hereto as 
Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
withdraw his no contest plea because the plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily made and defendant received the benefit of his 
bargain in the plea. Both the trial court and this court have 
excercised their jurisdiction properly in hearing this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS NO CONTEST PLEA. 
On appeal defendant asserts three bases for reversing 
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his no contest 
plea. First, in response to this court's holding in State v. 
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988)# defendant states that the trial court 
improperly applied the "record as a whole" analysis in 
determining the validity of his plea. Second, defendant states 
that the court did not comply with rule 11(e)(4), which requires 
that a defendant understand the nature and elements of an offense 
and that a plea is an admission of those elements, arguing that 
he did not admit to the offense and that he did not know what 
caused the injury to the victim (Br. of App. at 25, 26). 
Finally, defendant asserts that he did not receive the benefit of 
his bargain in the trial court's sentencing. 
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With regard to defendant's "strict compliance" with 
rule 11(e) argument, the State is aware of this Court's recent 
decisions concerning withdrawal of guilty pleas. This Court has 
made it clear in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. 
App.)# cert- denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Valencia/ 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Gentry, 
141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. August 24, 1990); and State 
v. Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep, 35 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1990), 
that it will apply an on-the-record "strict compliance" with rule 
11(e) test in assessing the validity of a guilty plea, 
interpreting State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), as 
creating a substantively new rule in guilty plea cases and 
replacing the prior "record as a whole" test. If this Court 
applies an on-the-record "strict compliance" test to the instant 
case, it will undoubtedly find that the trial court did not 
conduct the complete on-the-record review with defendant of the 
rule 11(e) requirements as mandated by Vasilacopulos, Valencia, 
Gentry and Pharris. 
As set forth in its briefs in those cases, the State 
believes that Gibbons did not substantively change the rule on 
withdrawal of guilty pleas and that the "record as a whole" test 
still governs the plea withdrawals. Consequently, the State has 
several cases pending before the Utah Supreme Court on this 
issue. Until the issue is finally resolved by that court, the 
3
 State v. Hoff, No. 900096 (Appellee's brief filed June 25, 
1990), is currently before the Utah Supreme Court, and the State 
is petitioning for writs of certiorari in Gentry and Pharris (a 
copy of the Gentry petition is attached hereto and incorporated 
herein as Addendum C). 
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State will continue to urge that this Court reconsider the 
"record as a whole" test and will continue to assert the 
4 
correctness of that standard. In the instant case the record as 
a whole amply supports the trial court's ruling that defendant's 
plea was knowing and voluntary. 
Second, defendant asserts that he did not admit to the 
offense and that he did not know what had happened to injure the 
victim (Br. of App. at 26). A no contest plea does not require 
that defendant admit to the offense. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-2(3) (1990): 
A plea of no contest indicates the accused 
does not challenge the charges in the 
information or indictment and if accepted by 
the court shall have the same effect as a 
plea of guilty and imposition of sentence may 
be rendered in the same manner as if a plea 
of guilty had been entered. 
Rule 11(e)(4) requires that defendant understand the 
nature and elements of the offense. At defendant's plea hearing, 
his attorney stated the factual basis and the elements of the 
offense, as follows: 
MS. LOY: . . . The factual basis I have 
placed in the fact slot [of defendant's 
affidavit] is he recklessly injured his 
grandmother by his actions while intoxicated 
which caused serious permanent disfigurement 
of her ear and the elements of aggravated 
assault are that he attempted with unlawful 
force or violence to recklessly do bodily 
injury to another by means likely to produce 
bodily injury. 
4 
Although the State concedes that, in light of Gentry and 
Pharris, this Court is unlikely to retreat from its conclusion 
that the record as a whole test no longer governs, it believes 
that continued argument on this point is necessary to preserve 
the issue for possible certiorari review. 
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(T. 2-3). That is a correct statement of both the nature and the 
elements of the offense. See In re McElhaney, 549 P.2d 328 (Utah 
1978) ("reckless conduct using means or force likely to produce 
serious bodily injury constitutes aggravated assault under 
subsection (l)(b) . • . M ) . Defendant testified that he 
5 
understood the elements as stated in the affidavit, and he did 
not challenge the factual basis of the charge (T. 6-7). Thus, 
the trial court complied with rule 11(e)(4) and section 77-13-
2(3) requirements. Defendant's argument is groundless. 
Defendant's final assertion, that he did not get the 
benefit of his bargain in the sentencing, is also groundless. 
The plea agreement was that the State would recommend that 
defendant be sentenced as though the offense were a class A 
misdemeanor (T. 2-3). The trial court told defendant that it was 
not bound by the recommendation, and defendant stated that he 
understood (T. 5). Defendant's attorney openly stated in court 
that defendant would "no doubt" be given more time in prison 
after his parole hearing, and defendant did not object (T. 11)• 
The trial court sentenced defendant as though the offense were a 
class A misdemeanor, in accordance with the State's 
recommendations (T. 14). The trial court so found (R. 258). 
Defendant received the full benefit of his plea bargain. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT HAVE PROPERLY 
EXERCISED THEIR JURISDICTION. 
Defense counsel's statement of the nature and elements of the 
offense is nearly a verbatim recitation of the same in 
defendant's affidavit. 
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Defendant argues that the trial court did not establish 
subject matter jurisdiction at the change of plea (Br. of App. at 
32). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp. 1990) , n[t]he 
district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminalr not Excepted in the Utah Constitution and not 
prohibited by law." Neither the Utah Constitution nor other law 
divests the district court of its jurisdiction over defendant's 
change of plea. His assertion to the contrary is meritless. 
Defendant states that this court has jurisdiction to 
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw the 
plea (Br. of App. at 33). The State agrees. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm the tri^l court's denial of defendant's motion td withdraw 
his no contest plea. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of October, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
^JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Brian 
E. Maguire, p_ro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020, this / 
day of October, 1990. _ . 4 /O • 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
«... . UJ.'III — ~ — • • " ' I I ^ H 
of the istri 
flBp IN CLERKS OFFICE 
^Rr: Lake County Utah 
In the District Court 
St; 
THE STATE PFMTAH, ) KSS 
tate of Utah ^ R 2 1 , 9 8 8 
n - v$, . . - ) Affidavit of Defendant 
dfruu/n, £ ' / T W A ^ ^ \
 crimintlNo PK-^-7'7 
Defendant / 
,j& 
/
^mHytothecharge<s) of: 
' ^ - f r ^ ^~ . f \ \P^<^^^—,,nA^T oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of 
^0 (Name vf Crime) 
. .AL€ .^'^ yiMiffiXKjJz \rfjjU'^ JOSJIM^Xwtl* 'A^A'^A1^ 
I have received a copy of the charge (Information) and understand the crimj I arp pleading-gmft? to is a 
and understand the punishment for this crime 
. prison term 
(Degree of Felony or Class of 
,e may be P'^T^Jj/K^Q U 
_, , .
 r sA, fe&>Q J^Hi-.y c* -^/tine, or both. ! am ..„.. 
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney 
who has explained my rights to me and I understand them. 
1. I know that I have a con$titutio*alright to plead not guilty and tp have a jury trial upon the charge to which I 
have entered a plea o f ^ w t ^ o r t o a trial by a judge should I desire. 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial. I have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my 
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and 
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so. the jury will be told that this may not be held 
against me. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every dement of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors. 
4. I know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I choose 
to do so. 
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. 7—7 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of-gu&y I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the 
preceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting -
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaitin^entencing uporfa 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. 
\J%~J O JIU JL +*. 
?iea ot~gt*Mty 1 am giving up my constitutional ngnts as set out in the 
ifrgj-agrv-guhy erf thewjMfTir^l.itjh ms pka uf guiltj u umtialr/SyV, lu 
>e. r iti Se te ci  n nother offense of whifch I have been 
c 
A. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea ofgmff does not mean that the Judge will not impose either a fine 
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and ml |>l llllUllI llU'P UjCWI UiaUi.^ Lja^ e^ y^ wrMong ^  ta whmciii •JtuHL?Uj^ glIl A 
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made lo induce me to plead |4*fejP^ollowingother charges 
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case numberts) or coum(s)): " ^ ^^X/LAfi^rv-s^^ / / V 
will be dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will be Hied against me for other crimes I may have committed which 
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge, &M: &^ £*LCUMAfa ^s^Uk &LS«M i^l^^cK 
am 
I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I knov^and und< 
*-^ / vears of ape have attended school through the lol Q^S^ 
i V J 
. years of age. have attended school through the 
Dated this 
understand the English language. 
erstand its contents. 1 
can read and 
day of. vWvM. 19 9? 
t /Defendant ^-N/I - s 
. Defenda t 
Subscribed and sworn to before me .day of. 
H DtXON HHNDLEY •JL»*f 
/^T^r^^^ 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY: 
I certify that I am the attorney for. 
Judge 
the defendant named above and I know he 
has read the Affidavit, or that 1 have read it to him, and I discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements, 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in ail respects accurate and true. 
Defense Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against &A^a. >K_ ±S-defendant. 
ecu rate. I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and ac . No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of thejdefendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of the plea 
would serve the public interest. 
74^H24^ 
Prosecuting Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's pleajof^Guiltv~ to the charge, set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered. s*\s >r- >7 
Done in Court this 
ADDENDUM B 
DAVID E. YOCOM L. ;• 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JAMES M. COPE, Bar No. 0726 ^ ^ * 
Deputy County Attorney
 B;^^J^C^o1^^ 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 ' U 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRIAN E. MAGUIRE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. CR88-377 
Honorable RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Defendant commenced these proceedings by claiming that 
his plea of no contest, entered in open court while he was 
represented by counsel, could be withdrawn by him because: 
1) The plea was not entered voluntarily; 
or 
2) The consideration for the plea, a 
promise by the State to limit the punishment 
to that of a Class A Misdemeanor, was 
destroyed by subsequent actions of the Parole 
Board; or 
3) The facts admitted by the defendant 
during the plea proceedings did not describe 
the statutory elements of the offense to 
which he plead guilty. 
A review of the Affidavit of the Defendant, Transcript of 
the plea proceedings, the written and oral arguments of counsel, as 
well as the documents contained in the court's file of this matter 
1. Defendant was charged on December 7, 1987 with 
Mayhem, a Second Degree Felony, and Aggravated Assault, a Third 
Degree Felony. This Information was amended on January 6, 1988 to 
allege that in addition to the above charges, defendant was a 
Habitual Criminal - a First Degree Felony. 
2. On March 4, 1988, after a preliminary hearing of the 
State's evidence, defendant pled not guilty to all of the charges 
against him. 
3. Sometime on or after April 18, 1988, defendant 
indicated at at Pre-Trial Conference that he would, on April 21, 
1988, enter a plea to one of the charges listed in the Information. 
4. The defendant executed a two page document headed 
-Affidavit of Defendant" on April 21, 1989 in open court. This 
document recited that the knew of his consitutional rights, chose 
to waive them voluntarily, and understood the consequences of 
entering a plea of no contest to the charge of Aggravated Assault. 
There was no evidence defendant was r>ot in control of his 
faculties. Additionally, the document recited that the State had 
agreed to recommend that the sentence to be imposed not exceed that 
of a Class A Misdemeanor. 
5. The State did make such a recommendation, and the 
defendant did receive the benefit of that recommendation. He was 
sentenced to 1 year in the County Jail, with thirty days credit 
granted by the sentencing judge, who also allowed the defendant's 
request to serve this time at the prison. Defendant exhibited a 
sophisticated understanding of the workings of the Board of Pardons 
during the proceedings on that day. 
6. Defendant admitted during the above proceeding that 
he had recklessly caused injury to his grandmother by permanently 
disfiguring her ear, causing serious bodily injury. Defendant now 
admits that his grandmother is dead. This would make her 
unavailable as a witness if the case were to be tried. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. The permanent disfigurement of an ear is a serious 
bodily injury. One who even recklessly causes serious bodily 
injury to another is guilty of Aggravated Assault if the means 
employed to achieve that result were reasonably likely to have 
caused it. See McElhanev, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah, 1978) The defendant 
admitted all of the elements of the offense of aggravated assault 
during the proceedings relative to his plea on April 21, 1988, even 
though he may not have had an exact mental image of what he did to 
his grandmother. 
II. The defendant's plea was entered knowingly and 
voluntarily. 
III. The State of Utah was not required by the terms and 
conditions of the plea bargain to intercede on defendant's behalf 
with the Board of Pardons. The State of Utah kept good faith with 
the defendant and delivered on each of the promises made to 
defendant up through sentencing. No agreement in the Affidavit of 
Defendant was breached or avoided by the State of Utah. 
IV. The defendant has already served the entire sentence 
which resulted from the nolo plea he now seeks to set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no factual, legal, statutory or equitable reason 
to allow defendant to set aside the plea of no contest he entered 
on April 21, 1988, in open court before Judge James S. Sawaya. 
DATED this /Jx day of December, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILIN 
I hereby certify that on this / ;.-- day of December, 
1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order to Connie Mower, Attorney for 
Defendant, at the address stated below. 
.1 4 • ' n " r l X ' L n >, m *„•<. -
Secretary 
U/: 
CONNIE MOWER 
Attorney for the Defendant 
623 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. i 
FRANK DAVID GENTRY, : Category No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole question presented for review is whether the 
court of appeals erroneously held that State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a "strict compliance" with rule 11(5), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which supersedes the "record as 
a whole" test traditionally applied on review to determine 
whether a guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on August 24, 
1990, and appears in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 
Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1990) (a copy of the court's opinion is 
contained in the addendum). 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Frank David Gentry, was charged with theft 
by deception, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6-
405 (1990), and criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor, under 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-206 (1990). 
After defendant pled not guilty to the charges, trial 
commenced before the district court sitting without a jury. 
After the close of the evidence, but prior to closing arguments, 
defendant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of theft, a 
third degree felony. The State dismissed the criminal trespass 
charge. The trial court stayed imposition of sentence and placed 
defendant on eighteen months' probation. 
Over two months after the acceptance of his guilty 
plea, defendant moved to withdraw it. The trial court denied 
this motion. 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
and remanded the case for a new trial on .the original charges. 
State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 24, 
1990). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A recitation of the facts of defendant's crimes is not 
necessary for purposes of this petition. The relevant facts are 
those stated above in the Statement of the Case. 
The facts underlying the charges against defendant are 
accurately summarized in the court of appeals' opinion. Gentry, 
141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26-27. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT 
STATE V. GIBBONS, 740 P.2D 1309 (UTAH 1987), 
ADOPTED A TEST OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 
11(5), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
WHICH SUPERSEDES THE "RECORD AS A WHOLE" TEST 
TRADITIONALLY APPLIED ON REVIEW TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER A GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND 
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. 
On appeal to the court of appeals, defendant argued, 
inter alia/ that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because "the trial court 
failed to explain to [him] the elements and facts of the crime of 
theft before he pled guilty, and . . . further erred by relying 
on an incomplete record as a substitute for Rule 11 compliance[] 
in determining that [he] entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences." State v. Gentry, 141 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 27. The State responded that, under the "record as 
a whole" test traditionally applied by this Court on post-
conviction review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea, see, 
e.g., Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
110 S. Ct. 751 (1990); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 
1988); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per 
2 
curiam), the trial court had not abused its discretion. 
The -record as a whole" test was stated in Miller as follows: 
[T]he absence of a finding under [rule 11] is 
not critical BO long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving. 
718 P.2d at 405. 
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In reversing and remanding to allow defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea, the court of appeals definitively 
rejected the State's argument that the "record as a whole*1 test 
applied, concluding that in State v. Gibbons# this Court 
"effectively replac[ed] the 'record as a whole' test with a 
strict Rule 11(5) compliance test in accepting a defendant's 
guilty plea," Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28—i.e., if the 
trial court has not strictly complied with rule 11(5), the guilty 
plea, although perhaps otherwise voluntary, must automatically be 
vacated. This conclusion misconstrues Gibbons and ignores 
significant language in both pre-Gibbons and post-Gibbons 
opinions of this Court that clearly cuts against the notion that 
Gibbons abandoned the record as a whole tfest for determining the 
voluntariness, and thus validity, of a guilty plea. 
In Gibbons, this Court did not review either the trial 
court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or the 
voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas. Rather, the 
Court, in the context of remanding the case because an attack on 
the voluntariness of a guilty plea must first be presented to the 
trial court in the form of a motion to withdraw, concluded that 
"a statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in 
all trial courts in this state is appropriate." Gibbons, 740 
P.2d at 1312. It then set out the specific requirements for 
taking of guilty pleas under rule 11 for the purpose of assisting 
the trial court on remand in determining the validity of the 
defendant'8 pleas. Ibid. The Gibbons Court did not even mention 
the record as a whole test for determining voluntariness of a 
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guilty plea, and the reason seems obvious: the Court was not 
reviewing the trial court record to determine the voluntariness 
of the defendant's pleas. Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion 
that Gibbons replaced the record as a whole test with a strict 
compliance test reads far too much into Gibbons. The Gibbons 
Court simply did not address that issue. 
Furthermore, certain language in several post-Gibbons 
opinions of this Court strongly suggests that the record as a 
whole test was not modified by Gibbons. For example, in Jolivet 
v. Cook, this Court stated: 
We first address Jolivet's claim that his 
guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. 
Specifically, Jolivet argues that Judge Burns 
erred in the taking of his guilty pleas 
because he did not make findings that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged 
and how those elements related to the facts, 
as required by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), or that Jolivet knew the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. In fact, Jolivet claims that he 
did not know or understand these things when 
he entered his pleas. 
[Rule 11(5)(d)] requires that before a 
trial court accepts a guilty plea, it must 
find that the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he or she is entering the plea. In Gibbons, 
this Court stated that in making this 
finding, the trial court must ensure that the 
defendant understands "the elements of the 
crimes charged and the relationship of the 
law to the facts." Id. at 1312. In 
addition, [rule 11(5)(e)] requires that 
before the trial court accepts a guilty plea, 
it must find that the defendant knows of the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. The record clearly shows that at 
the time the guilty pleas were accepted, 
Judge Burns did not make the findings 
required by [rule 11(5)], i.e., that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged 
and how these elements related to the facts 
-5-
and that Jolivet knew the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences. 
However, this Court has held, *[T]he absence 
of a finding under [rule 11] is not critical 
so long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving.- State v. Miller, 718 
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 
709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. 
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985). 
784 P.2d at 1149-50 (footnotes omitted). And in State v. 
Copeland, the Court, without citing Gibbons, said: 
The United States Supreme Court has said, 
M[T]here is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the 
plea is entered the defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the charge against him." 
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1173 
(emphasis in the original). We think the 
most effective way to do this is to have the 
defendant state*in his own words his 
understanding of the offense and the actions 
which make him guilty of the offense. By 
this statement, the trial court can assure 
itself that the defendant is truly submitting 
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the 
record on appeal will clearly reflect the 
defendant'8 understanding. Although this 
method is therefore preferable to others, it 
is not absolutely required. The test is 
voluntariness. We hold that the record 
demonstrates that defendant admitted acts 
sufficient to justify his conviction of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty. 
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
Although both Jolivet and Copeland involved pre-Gibbons 
guilty pleas, Gentryf 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, this Court did 
not note or attach any significance to that fact in either 
opinion, and, in fact, directly applied Gibbons in Jolivet in 
concluding that although the trial court did not strictly comply 
with rule 11, the record as a whole demonstrated that Jolivet 
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entered his guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily. Jolivet, 784 
P.2d at 1149-51. This seriously undermines the court of appeals' 
effort to distinguish Jolivet and Copeland on the basis that the 
record as a whole test was applied in those cases because they 
involved pre-Gibbons guilty pleas. Significantly, in State v. 
Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), which involved a post-Gibbons 
guilty plea, this Court apppeared to apply the record as whole 
test in reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's 
4 
motion to withdraw. 
Finally, that the record as a whole test represents the 
most reasonable standard upon which to assess a post-conviction 
attack on the voluntariness of a guilty plea is made clear in the 
following passage from State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986): 
A final word on the State's Rule 11 
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's 
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that 
was struck, the State has argued, in effect, 
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty 
pleas should always be voided when the trial 
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The 
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and 
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well. 
This position is shortsighted, for to follow 
It is not clear what significance State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 
670 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), which was issued five days before 
Jolivet, has in this inquiry. Unlike Jolivet, Hickman declined 
to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons guilty plea on the ground that 
Gibbons represented a clear break from the past and would 
therefore not be applied retroactively. Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672 
n.l. Insofar as Hickman might be read to support the court of 
appeals' strict compliance test, it is inconsistent with Jolivet 
and should not be followed. 
4 
The court of appeals obviously disagrees with this reading of 
Smith, having cited it in support of its decision in the instant 
case, Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, and stating directly in 
State v. Pharris, Case No. 890549-CA, slip op. at 8 n.6 (Utah Ct. 
App. Sept. 14, 1990), a case issued after Gentry, that Smith 
applied the "strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons." 
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it would be to sanction a remedy far worse 
than the wrong* If we were to to hold any 
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the 
resultant plea, even when the plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would 
encourage defendant's, convicted and 
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their 
convictions for purely tactical reasons, 
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas 
corpus long after the fact. We have refused 
to overturn convictions upon such challenges 
in the past, e.g., State v. Knowles, Utah, 
709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah, 
709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic] and we find no 
reason to encourage such attacks in the 
future. 
Overturning such convictions—which we 
would have to do if we embraced the rationale 
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's 
concurring opinion—would require the State 
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably 
long after the challenged guilty pleas were 
entered and when the passage of time would 
make reprosecution impractical,'if not 
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate 
result would be to free a number of convicted 
persons for nothing more than technical 
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary 
guilty pleas. 
717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote omitted) . This view is consistent 
with the harmless error rule long recognized by this court in a 
variety of contexts. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071 
Most jurisdictions apply a record as a whole test rather than 
the strict compliance rule adopted by the court of appeals. See, 
e.g., United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(district court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does 
not warrant reversal where defendant's knowledge of rights waived 
was otherwise apparent); Wood v. State, 190 Ga.App. 179, 378 
S.E.2d 520 (6a. App. 1989) (where defendant was otherwise 
informed of rights waiyed, harmless error standard is applied to 
trial court's failure to comply with rule governing taking of 
pleas); People v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 448 N.W.2d 781, 
783 (Mich. App. 1989) ("record as a wholeH demonstrated that plea 
was made knowingly and voluntarily); People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 
9, 459 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1983) (voluntariness of plea determined 
by considering all relevent circumstances surrounding it, not by 
judge's ritualistic recitation of rights waived). 
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(Utah 1989) (harmless error standard for nonconstitutional 
error); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989) ("with 
respect to certain constitutional errors, we must place on the 
State the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt"). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61. Interestingly, the court of 
appeals did not so much as mention Kay, even though the State 
cited the foregoing quoted language from Kay to it in its brief. 
See State v. Gentry, Case No. 890145-CA, Br. of Appellee at 17-
18. 
In sum, a careful reading of Gibbons and this Court's 
pre- and post-Gibbons decisions indicates that the court of 
appeals erred in holding that Gibbons replaced the record as a 
whole test with a strict compliance test. A strict compliance 
test is not required either by Gibbons or logic. 
Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari because 
the court of appeals has rendered a decision on a question of law 
which is in conflict with decisions of this Court. Utah R. App. 
P. 46(b). Insofar as the issue of what standard applies on 
review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is unsettled in 
light of Gibbons, certiorari should be granted because the court 
of appeals has decided an important question of law which should 
be settled by this Court. Utah R. App. P. 46(d). 
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